Globalization, in its multiple interpretations, is seen by many people as a great possibility of improving living standards in developing countries. Trade and financial integration can encourage competition, technology transfers and specialization according to comparative advantage principles. Indeed, after decades of protectionism with very poor results, many countries have actively opened their economies to global competition in search for such great opportunities. Although in many cases the results are encouraging, for a vast group of countries the last two or three decades have been years of turmoil, stagnation and financial crises. These complications have enhanced the criticisms across the world to the process of global integration (Stiglitz (2002)). This paper argues that many of these costs follow from governments' policies aimed to limit or restrict the scope of integration of countries with the rest of the world. In the presence of international technology differences, limited or restricted integration may generate wage and employment adjustments that could be avoided if countries were to embrace globalization without restrictions. I present a very stylized model where financial integration leads to specialization. In this setting, countries that avoid specialization through trade distortions have much greater downward pressures on wages than countries that do specialize. Moreover, if non-tradable prices are downward rigid and there are some limits to the current account deficits countries can run, employment costs may arise. The model shows that these costs may be greater with a limitedglobalization strategy than with a laissez-faire policy. 1
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The world is comprised by many countries. There are two tradable goods, x and y, and a non-tradable good n. Commodity x is capital-intensive, while n is labor-intensive ((K/L) x > (K/L) y > (K/L) n ). Each good is produced with CRS fixed-proportions technology 3 , and two factors of production: labor L and capital K.
Product and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
Countries are price takers. Nevertheless, domestic prices are affected by tariffs imposed in each country.
Regarding factor markets, labor is completely mobile across sectors within a country but immobile internationally. Capital is mobile across borders, but the return to capital is not completelly equalized because there are some restrictions for capital flows. In particular, the international return to capital faced by a country is r * , that is set in a big foreign country denoted hereafter with a * . However, the domestic return to capital r is only a fraction of r * due to restrictions to capital movements: r = λr * where λ ∈ (0, 1] is a policy variable that reflects the degree of international financial integration. The zero-profit condition in sector i = x, y, n in country c is given by
where p c i is the domestic price of good i (p n in the case of the non-tradable good and p w i (1 + τ c i ) for
x and y where p w i is the world price of good i and τ c i is the tariff in industry i). a c F i is the technology parameter that measures the requirement of factor F = L, K to produce one unit of good i. 4 Finally, w c and λ c r * are domestic wages and return to capital. I also assume that there exist sector-specific hicks-neutral international technology differences. Algebraically, a c Li = (1+δ c i )a * Li and a c Ki = (1+δ c i )a * Ki with δ c i > 0. The rationale for this assumption is the following. An analysis of the wage and employment implications of global integration in developing countries must take into account cross-country wage differences. Trefler (1993) provides evidence that international wage differences are related to international technology differences. Lucas (1990) also stresses the role of some form of technology differences to explain why the return to capital is not higher in labor-abundant countries.
For tradable sectors, equation (1) can be rewritten as (hereafter, I eliminate the superscript c unless required for presentation purposes)
In the initial equilibrium, I assume that λ, τ x and τ y are such that both tradable goods are produced.
In other words, (2) hold for x and y. International wage differences are given by
where θ * F i is the share of factor F = L, K in value-added in sector i = x, y. Relative wages w/w * are decreasing on δ i and λ. Tariffs also affect nominal wage differences, but their impact on real wages is ambiguous due to their effect on average consumer prices.
Globalization under Flexible Prices
Consider that globalization is a process of increasing integration in goods and capital markets. In terms of the model, this implies a fall in average tariffs and a rise in λ c . 5 Consider first the case of a rise in λ.
Given τ x and τ y , capital-intensive sector x becomes non-competitive. This is evident from estimating the fall in wages consistent with each zero-profit condition in (2) , that is given by ∂w i /∂λ = −θ * Ki /θ * Li · w * . This expression is smaller in x. The new equilibrium wage rate is determined by the zero profit condition in the labor-intensive sector y. This implies that
where 4z refers to the change in z. The effect on the non-tradable product price is For γ x = γ y = γ, the effect on international wage differences is given by
Consider first that 4τ = 0. The fall in domestic wages is greater than in (4). This is consistent with the required increase in protection to industry x. The fall in wages is even greater if average tariffs fall;
4τ ≤ 0. This result reveals that a diversified production structure is sustained with greater distortions in relative prices, pressuring wages downward. The effect on p n is
Consistent with the evolution of wages, the equilibrium depreciation of the real exchange rate is greater than in the case of unlimited globalization. The term in square brackets in (7) is greater (in absolute terms) than the corresponding term in equation (5) . Again, it is not clear whether the new equilibrium implies capital inflows or outflows, but an improvement in the current account compared to the initial equilibrium is expected. 7
Globalization under Sticky Prices
In this section I analyze the impact of sticky nominal non-tradable prices, and therefore demand determined non-tradable production, on the evolution of wages and employment. Unlike the previous case, unemployment may arise if restrictions to the size of the current account deficit exist. For simplicity, I assume that wages are not sticky. This asymmetry between nominal wages and non-tradable prices assures that at least one tradable sector remains productive.
As before, financial integration generates downward pressures on domestic wages and non-tradable prices.
However, 4p n = 0. Non-tradable output and factor usage (L n and K n ) will depend on the evolution of demand, in particular, on nominal income. Assuming that individuals have identical log-linear utility functions, non-tradable consumption is a constant share of income: p n c n = α(wL + rK). For a constant p n , non-tradable factor usage is determined by the following two equations
where w 0 and w 1 are the wage rate before and after the change in λ. Similar for r. K is the domestic stock of capital, while L e is the aggregate level of employment. Under full employment, L e = L. Equation non-tradable prices. The left-hand-side of (9) represents non-tradable demand, that depends on nominal income. The effects of changes in λ on nominal income are twofold. First, it affects relative factor prices change, but this is a second order effect. Second, changes in λ affect income depending on aggregate labor and capital usage. Under full employment, there is no effect on income and non-tradable demand. Therefore, at constant p n there is no change in L n and K n . In this scenario, production of the labor-intensive tradable is either consistent with capital inflows or capital outflows, depending on the size of the non-tradable sector in the initial equilibrium. This can be seen by writing factor intensity in industry y as
If inflows of 4K M take place and unemployment is DD 1 . This is an equilibrium as long as L e = L − DD 1 is consistent with the demand for n implicit in C. In general, an equilibrium with aggregate employment L e is attainable if k y = (K + 4K M − K n (L e ))/(L e − L n (L e )) and L e < L. The full employment equilibrium is always possible. The model does not provide any element to pin down which equilibrium will prevail.
With limited globalization, unemployment may also arise. In this case, capital inflows required to sustain a diversified product mix are greater than those under specialization in y. In terms of figure   1 , if the endowment vector for tradable production is C, and 4K M = CD, aggregate unemployment is DD 2 > DD 1 . 10 It is possible to show that ∂L e /∂w 1 < 0, revealing that the level of aggregate employment consistent with equilibrium unemployment is lower with an interventionist policy that pushes wages down.
Moreover, a diversified strategy may generate unemployment in a scenario where laissez-faire leads to full employment. 
